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Abstract: This article presents an embedded 
distributed tool for health assessment of complex 
systems. The presented architecture is based on a 
solving method for embedded technical diagnostics 
and prognostics. This tool provides services 
enabling the evaluation of the health status of 
complex systems. Diagnostic services provide 
information for the maintenance decision support 
system that leads to reduce the periods of 
unavailability and determine if their future mission 
can be carried out. The diagnostic and prognostic 
functions are detailed and the exchanged data are 
specified. An example shows the feasibility of the 
proposed architecture and demonstrates the 
correctness of the developed algorithms. 
Keywords: Distributed diagnosis, prognosis, health 
status, embedded systems, transportation systems. 
1. Introduction 
Transportation systems are the objects of new 
regulations in terms of environment, goods and 
people safety, and the needs of new services have 
consequences on the complexity of embedded 
systems. To face this increasing complexity, multiple 
functionalities of the resources are embedded and 
deployed into networks of functions achieved by Line 
Replaceable Units (LRU). Faulty LRUs are replaced 
when the vehicle is at its base and repaired in the 
maintenance workshops, while the repaired system 
carries on with its mission. The increasing number of 
functionalities of the embedded systems contributes 
to raise the possession and acquisition costs leading 
the resources customers to optimize their availability 
rate. 
 
Bringing into operation the Condition-Based 
Maintenance (CBM) recommendations usually 
improve the equipment availability [1, 2]. Indeed, the 
CBM depends on the effectiveness of the system 
state provided by monitoring and diagnostic 
functions. They are carried out in particular from on 
line data that an embedded centralized diagnostic 
function generally process. However, in the case of 
system of systems also called complex system, the 
identification of the faulty components is difficult 
using centralized architectures. After the mission, 
the maintenance operators must collect information 
by interactions with the embedded diagnostic 
system, in order to isolate possible faulty LRUs, and 
to apply troubleshooting procedures. The drawbacks 
of such architectures are related to the numerous 
pieces of information to process, which might be 
wrong. The automated diagnostic processes 
combine these errors and lead to useless removals 
of LRUs. Those removals are costly and increase 
the risk of damaging the system. 
 
The technical diagnosis of transportation systems 
provides to the maintenance operators a list of LRUs 
that should be replaced. When the diagnosis is done 
online, the maintenance operators prepare the 
intervention sooner, reducing the duration and the 
costs of maintenance actions. The main task of a 
diagnostic function is to deliver an advice on a set of 
faulty components and to determine the severity of 
the fault. A difficulty in diagnosing such complex 
systems is due to their numerous kinds of functions 
integrating different technologies (electronics, data 
processing, mechanics, hydraulics…). Thus, the 
implemented diagnostic techniques must be adapted 
to the knowledge available about the system. During 
its use, various faults may impact the resource. 
Those faults degrade its operating modes. Three 
types of faults are considered: Cataleptic, 
Permanent and Fugitive. 
 
Different implementations of the monitoring and 
diagnostic functions associated to the LRUs exist. 
The LRU hosts its monitoring and diagnostic 
functions, the diagnostic function can also be hosted 
in another platform or, the monitoring and diagnostic 
functions can totally be distributed in different 
platforms. 
 
In the case of aircrafts, the Centralized Maintenance 
System (CMS) provide a list of likely faulty LRUs for 
the maintenance operator. This list is established 
according to information provided by the built-in test 
equipments that collect monitoring information from 
the LRUs and generate tests if they are needed. 
CMS correlates data to provide a “pre-diagnosis” of 
the LRUs. The flight warning system provides to the 
cockpit crew information on aircraft failed functions 
[3, 4]. 
 
Complex systems can be considered as sets of 
systems that depend more or less on each other. A 
system implements one or several functions. For 
safety purposes, functions can be redundant as well 
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as the LRUs implementing them. That explains why 
several models are necessary to classify the 
different operating modes of the LRUs and their 
health status. 
 
In this paper, a decentralized/distributed health 
assessment is proposed for reducing the number of 
useless removals of LRUs and for providing 
information about the availability of the system. For 
applications to systems of systems, monitoring and 
diagnostic functions can be implemented closer to 
the LRUs thanks to the multi-agent approach. In the 
case of a distributed approach, a collaborative 
mechanism between diagnostic agents have to 
enable the convergence of the local diagnoses 
towards a set of accused LRUs which should ideally 
correspond to the true faulty ones. Furthermore, 
prognostic agents are in charge of evaluating the 
Remaining Useful Lifetime (RUL) of systems and 
functions of the complex system from the RUL of 
LRUs provided by a monitoring layer. The Health 
Status is computed from the results provided by the 
diagnostic and prognostic agents. 
2. System of systems modeling 
Generally, the system is analyzed from different 
models in order to obtain a satisfying representation 
for diagnosis purpose. This analysis enables to 
collect the available knowledge on the complex 
systems. Many of them are helpful to design their 
diagnostic functions. In the literature [5-8], these 
models can be functional, structural, behavioral and 
teleological. They enable to model the behavior of 
components, of functions and of their interactions 
according to normal or degraded modes. In other 
studies, models are added to evaluate the diagnosis 
confidence [9]. 
 
A Complex System (CS) can be defined by a finite 
set of m system ∑i. CS = {∑1, ∑2,.., ∑m}. A system ∑i 
can be defined as a set of n function Fi,j. ∑i = {Fi,1, 
Fi,2,..,Fi,n}. A function Fi,j can be defined as a set of k 
LRUs implementing this function. Fi,j = {LRUi,j,1, 
…,LRUi,j,k}. If a LRU contribute to the implementation 
of more than one function, this one should be 
duplicated as many times as it contributes to the 
implementation of function. If an LRU contributes to 
the implementation of 3 functions, it must exist three 
LRUs of that kind when defining the system. The fact 
that these LRUs are equivalent must be declared in 
the knowledge base. After defining the hierarchical 
decomposition of the system, a system modeling 
has to be formalized for ensuring system diagnostic. 
In this paper, the necessary System Knowledge to 
diagnose the complex system are collected in the 
set SK made of four types of knowledge: functional, 
structural, behavioral and topological. 
The Functional Description (FD) is the set of 
functions ensured by every system. FD represents 
links between LRUs, functions and system. 
The Structural Description (SD) is dedicated to the 
identification of the set of LRUs and of physical 
connections between them. SD introduce predicate 
CONNECT(X,Y) that means that X is connected to 
Y. S : CONNECT(LRUi,j,q, LRUp,r,s) with q and s 
respectively one of the LRUs implementing Fi,j and 
Fp,r. 
The behavioral models are used in order to identify 
the relevant indicators that are used to generate 
symptoms for the various faults that may affect the 
LRUs. They help to classify the faults of the LRUs 
from their symptoms. For diagnostic purpose, the 
knowledge BM provides the relationships between 
the symptoms, the LRUs and their faults. 
The Topological Dependencies (TD) determines the 
proximities of components that may be the origin of 
indirect failures or faults of a LRU due to the 
proximity of another failed one. TD introduce 
predicate TOPO(X,Y) that means that X is close to Y 
and that some faults of X may affect the functioning 
of Y. TD: TOPO(LRUi,j,q, LRUp,r,s) with q and s 
respectively one of the LRUs implementing Fi,j and 
Fp,r. 
Finally, BMTDFDSD=SK  
3. Embedded health assessment 
The OSA-CBM project [10] defines a Health 
Assessment (HA) layer whose primary function 
determines the health status of a monitored system, 
subsystem, equipment or component in terms of 
fault, failure, availability. The health assessment 
module should take into account diagnoses, trends 
in the health history, operational status and loading, 
and the maintenance history. The HA layer provides 
the Health Status (HS) of a monitored entity. 
 
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is 
defined in [11] as the phase involved with predicting 
future behavior, including RUL, in terms of current 
operating state and the scheduling of required 
maintenance actions. According to [12], diagnosis 
and prognosis are processes of assessment of a 
system’s health. Diagnosis is an assessment about 
the current and past health of a system based on 
observed symptoms, and prognosis is an 
assessment of the future health. 
The different results given by diagnostic and 
prognostic functions must be considered as a 
decision support to operate appropriately on the 
system. In the proposed approach, the HA is 
introduced as a combination of the results of the 
diagnostic and prognostic functions. 
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Ideally, the diagnosis identifies a set ∆2 of failed 
function and locates their causes, i.e. a set ∆1 of 
faulty LRUs from a set of symptoms S and a set of 
tests T. This leads to the next relationship where 
Diag is the diagnostic function: 
(∆1, ∆2) = Diag(SK, S, T) 
 
The function Diag can be implemented thanks to two 
sub-functions: Diag1 and Diag2. The function Diag1 
allows, starting from a set of symptoms and a set of 
tests, to identify the set of faulty LRUs of the system 
∆1 = Diag1(SK, S, T), where ∆1 = 
{AB(LRUi,j,k),…,AB(LRUp,r,s)} and the function Diag2 
enables to locate the set of failed function from tests 
and the set of failed LRUs: ∆2 = Diag2(SK, ∆1, T) 
where ∆2 = {AB(Fi,j),…,AB(Fp,r)}. AB(.) denotes either 
a faulty LRU or a failed function. 
 
The prognostic function, that completes the 
diagnostic function, has been the subject of many 
studies since the end of the 90s. Prognostic allows 
determining the RUL of a component or a system 
[13]. In [14], the prognostic is defines as the 
capability to provide early detection of the precursor 
and/or incipient fault condition (very “small” fault) of 
a component, and to have the technology and 
means to manage and predict the progression of this 
fault condition to component failure. A global point of 
view of the studies realized on prognostic is 
proposed in [15]. The RUL can either be determined 
by indicators extrapolation or from failure probability 
of the component of the system like the Mean Time 
To Failure (MTTF) or the Mean Time Between 
Failures (MTBF). The RUL is an assessment of the 
remaining operational time until the system becomes 
unable to complete its mission successfully 
according to the conditions of operation. This means 
that the prognostic function requires a historic of the 
current and future mission with their constraints. This 
knowledge allows determining thresholds beyond 
which the LRU cannot carry out the mission in 
nominal mode. In short term, the data about the 
current mission are used online and in long-term, the 
data about the future mission are used when the 
system is in the maintenance area. Of course, this 
threshold is not useful when determining the 
likelihood of failure. The RUL of an LRU is ensured 
by the monitoring layer. Let us note RUL(LRUi,j,k) the 
RUL of the LRUi,j,k, TBAB(LRUi,j,k) the Time Before 
Abnormal Behavior of the LRUi,j,k. and TBAB(Fi,j) the 
TBAB of the function Fi,j, As it exists dependencies 
between LRUs and RUL are the data generated by 
the monitoring, TBAB is introduced and can be 
defined by : TBAB(LRUi,j,k) = Min(RUL(LRUi,j,k), 
TBAB(LRUi,j,k), TBABstruc(LRUs)) 
where TBABstruc(LRUs) is the set of TBAB of 
upstream structurally dependent LRU of the LRUi,j,k. 
 
Therefore, for a given function Fi,j without redundant 
LRUs, RUL(Fi,j) = Min (TBAB(LRUi,j,1), …, 
TBAB(LRUi,j,k)). Let us considered now the case of a 
function Fi,j implemented by A redundant LRUs. And 
this function is not considered as failed if at least B 
of A LRUs are not failed. In this case, TBAB(Fi,j) is 
equal to the B
th 
maximum RUL among the A TBAB 
of each LRUs implementing Fi,j. For example, if a 
function Fi,j is ensured by LRUi,j,1, LRUi,j,2 and 
LRUi,j,3, and the function is not considered as failed if 
at least 2 of this 3 LRUs are not failed. Given 
RUL(LRUi,j,1) = 5UT, RUL(LRUi,j,2) = 10UT and 
RUL(LRUi,j,3) = 15UT, TBAB (Fi,j) = 10 UT. 
 
Ideally, the prognosis identifies the set ∏2 of the 
RUL of each function implementing the system of 
systems and the set ∏1 of RUL of each LRU from a 
set of extrapolated data ED and a set of threshold 
Th. This leads to the next relationship where Prog is 
the prognostic function: 
(∏1, ∏2) = Prog(SK, ED, Th) 
The function Prog can be implemented thanks to two 
sub-functions. The function Prog1 allows, starting 
from a set of extrapolated data and a set of 
threshold, to identify the set of TBAB of the LRUs of 
a function ∏1 = Prog1(SK, RUL, TBAB), where ∏1 = 
{TBAB (LRUi,j,k),…, TBAB (LRUp,r,s)} and the function 
Prog2 enables to locate the set of failed function 
from tests and the set of failed LRUs: ∏2 = 
Prog2(SK, ∏1) where ∏2 = {TBAB (Fi,j),…, TBAB 
(Fp,r)}. TBAB (.) denotes either the TBAB of a LRU or 
the TBAB of a function. 
 
In this paper, the health management of the system 
is ensured by a diagnostic function and a prognostic 
function. Data produced by these functions, list of 
RULs, faulty components and failed functions, are 
differently interpreted according to the current end 
user of the system. This implies the use of different 
kinds of histories and knowledge, including safety 
limits of the system defined by the operator. 
Considering HS(X) the Health Status of X, the health 
status of an LRU can be defined by: 
))AB(LRU)(TBAB(LRU
))¬AB(LRU)(TBAB(LRU
=)HS(LRU
kj,i,kj,i,
kj,i,kj,i,
kj,i,
 
Considering 
ji,
F
Δ1  the list of failed LRUs 
implementing the function Fi,j and 
ji,
F
Π1  the list of 
the RUL of LRUs implementing Fi,j the health status 
of Fi,j can be defined as: )Π(Δ=)HS(F
ji,
F
ji,
F
ji, 11 . 
The health status of the complex system is also 
defined as: )Π(Δ=HS(SC) 22  and can be 
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described as a use case diagram available in figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: Use case diagram of a maintenance 
system 
4. A distributed architecture for health 
assessment 
Distributed approaches of Information and 
Communication Technologies often provide 
satisfying solutions to face complexity. The 
diagnostic function was implemented in a distributed 
structure according to the multi-agent system 
concept. The agents of the structure cooperate and 
exchange data whatever the language used to 
model the information they contain is. This 
implementation requires data and models that have 
been collected and organized. In the case of 
complex systems, some works [16-18] show the 
feasibility to implement an embedded distributed 
diagnostic function with or without cooperation 
between its elements. 
 
In figure 2, the architecture presented is based on a 
distributed implementation. Local diagnostic agents 
cooperate to diagnose the system. A middleware 
makes it possible to implement the services provided 
by the agents. The architecture consists of several 
LRUs gathered into several functions denoted LRU 
layer. Each LRU is observed by a monitoring 
function. The monitoring layer represents the 
monitoring functions designed by the suppliers. The 
monitoring functions send their symptoms to 
Diagnostic Agents (DAs). Using the cause-symptom 
relations, each DA determines the set of faulty LRUs 
among the LRUs that implement a function. One or 
more databases (KB) contain the set SK that 
supports the activities of the DAs. A Human/Machine 
Interface (HMI) displays the failed functions of the 
system for the production operators and the LRUs to 
replace or to fix for the maintenance operators. If the 
collaboration is correct the global diagnosis of the 
system in terms of faulty LRUs is the union of local 
diagnoses. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distributed approach of Health 
Assessment 
 
Several types of data are considered: a “symptom” is 
generated by the monitoring layer, a “faulty LRU 
message” is generated by the function “To 
propagate symptom” of a DA. A “known symptom” is 
has at least one cause identified by an analysis done 
at the system design stage and stored in KB. An 
“unknown symptom” has no cause identified in KB. 
 
The activities of the diagnostic function are carried 
out by cooperation between the DAs. The reception 
of a symptom by a DA starts the process. The 
corresponding DA begins by inserting the received 
symptom in the chronologic list according to the date 
the monitoring layer. Then, the DA checks the type 
of symptom received. If the symptom is known, the 
database returns the cause of failure of the LRU and 
the DA declares it as known, otherwise, the cause of 
failure of the LRU is declared as unknown. It also 
manages the list of symptoms, chronologically. ∆1 
and ∆2 are updated according to the type of the 
symptom and the answers of the database dealing 
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with a status of the symptom (known or unknown) in 
the case of a failure symptom. Then, the DA 
searches structural dependencies with the failed 
LRU thanks to KB. If there is at least one dependent 
LRU, “propagation symptoms” are sent to the DAs 
that diagnose those LRUs which may not operate 
correctly and are declared “out of order”. During this 
stage, the DA updates ∆1 and ∆2 according to the 
chronological list of symptoms. The status and the 
timestamp of the LRU are updated and data are 
recorded and displayed. Supervision of the DAs is 
ensured during “the fault propagation” function. If a 
DA did not confirm that it receives the message 
during the propagation task, the diagnostic process 
declares the agent as failed. 
 
The evolution of the status of a LRU is shown in 
figure 3. An LRU is declared as “OK” at the 
beginning of the process. If an “unknown symptom” 
is received, the status switches to “unknown failure” 
(see (1) in the figure). If a symptom is received and 
this symptom (or set of symptom) is known, the 
status of the LRU is defined as “known failure” (see 
(2) in the figure). The reception of a Faulty LRU 
message only allows switching the status of the LRU 
from “OK” to “Out of Order” (see (3) in the figure). 
Four different values describe the state of a LRU: 
 “OK” when the LRU is not faulty, 
 “UF” when the LRU is faulty but the cause is 
unknown (Unknown Failure), 
 “KF” when the cause of its failure is known 
(Known Failure), 
 “OO” when the LRU does not work in 
nominal mode or is failed because of the 
failure of another LRU (Out of Order). 
 
 
Figure 3: Status of a LRU 
In our case, the status of an LRU evolved differently. 
The status of the LRU is estimated by the DA that 
received data whose causality is not respected 
(according to apparition timestamp). As it is possible 
to challenge the order of reception of the data 
(symptoms and Faulty_LRU_Messages), the 
evolution of the status of a LRU is different as shown 
in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated LRU status by DA 
The red arrows denote that the causality was not 
respected. Arrows number 4 (in the case of an 
unknown failure) and 5 (in the case of a known 
failure) in figure 4 mean that a faulty LRU message 
has been diagnosed before a symptom. Arrows 
numbers 3 and 6 in figure 4 mean that a symptom 
has been diagnosed before a faulty LRU message. 
The arrow number 7 denotes that a symptom or a 
set of symptoms was firstly declared has unknown 
but, because of the symptom(s) received afterward, 
it becomes a known failed situation. When a LRU is 
subjected to a known or an unknown failure, the 
known failure is privileged in the results. Whatever 
the kind of failure is known or unknown, the LRU 
must be removed. 
 
Therefore, there are two different ways to process 
the diagnosis depending on data received by the DA 
(symptom or Faulty_LRU_Message). Whatever the 
data (symptom or Faulty_LRU_message) the 
diagnostic function has to deal with, the results are 
recorded in the blackboard of the DA. Every time the 
DA receives a symptom or a Faulty_LRU_message, 
the old diagnostic result is duplicated and one copy 
is updated according to the data received. The 
blackboard of a DA contains the evolution of the 
status of the LRUs and of its implemented function 
and the data (symptom or Faulty_LRU_message). 
From this historic, it is possible to track the evolution 
of the status of each LRUs and each function of the 
system according to received data. The algorithm of 
the function ToDiagnose(Symptom) describes the 
behavior of the diagnostic function when a DA 
receives a symptom sent by the Monitoring layer. 
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Algorithm ToDiagnose(Symptom) 
Return the results in the blackboard of the DA 
 
1. Begin 
2. Verify the symptom chronology 
3. Define L the list of data ever diagnosed that 
appeared after symptom received 
4. Query the database for knowing if the failure is 
identified 
5. Change the status of the LRU incriminated by the 
symptom according to database answer and LRU 
current status (OK to UF, OK to KF OR UF to KF) 
6. While L is not empty 
7.  ToDiagnose(L.data) 
8. EndWhile 
9. Query the database for structural dependencies 
10. While it exists dependencies 
11.  Send(Faulty_LRU_Message) to DA 
12. EndWhile 
13. End 
The algorithm of the function 
ToDiagnose(Faulty_LRU_Message) describes the 
behavior of the diagnostic function when receiving a 
Faulty_LRU_Message sent by another DA. 
Algorithm ToDiagnose(Faulty_LRU_Message) 
Return the results in the blackboard of the DA 
 
1. Begin 
2. Verify the Faulty_LRU_Message chronology 
3. Define L the list of data ever diagnosed that 
appeared after Faulty LRU Message received 
4. Change the status of the LRU incriminated by the 
Faulty LRU Message (OK to OO) 
5. While L is not empty 
6.  ToDiagnose(L.data) 
7. EndWhile 
8. Query the database for structural dependencies 
9. While it exists dependencies 
10.  Send(Faulty_LRU_Message) to DA 
11. EndWhile 
12. End 
 
The activities chain involved when a symptom is 
generated is showed in figure 5 
.
 
Figure 5: Activity Diagram of the distributed diagnosis system
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The Send function sends Faulty_LRU_Message to 
the DA in charge of diagnosing the LRU incriminated 
by the Faulty_LRU_Message and launch the 
algorithm “ToDiagnose(Faulty_LRU_Message)” of 
this DA. 
Aiming at prognosing the LRUs and the functions, 
the monitoring layer sends RUL of each LRU 
periodically to the corresponding Prognostic Agents 
(PAs). Each PA is prognosing one function of the 
system and uses KB. Figure 6 shows the activity 
diagram of a PA. The reception of a RUL or a 
TBAB_message by a PA starts its process. A 
TBAB_message is a message send by a PA to a 
PA. A TBAB_message is composed of the number 
of the upstream LRU monitored by the PA that 
sends the TBAB_message, the calculated TBAB of 
this LRU and the number of the LRU the upstream 
LRU is structurally connected to. Finally, the 
TBAB_message is send to the PA that computes the 
downstream LRU. The involved PA updates the 
Time Before Abnormal Behavior (TBAB) of this LRU 
in the list it manages for each LRU implementing the 
function it prognoses. When a PA receives for the 
first time a TBAB_message from another PA that 
prognoses an upstream LRU, it records the 
TBAB_message. This record is updated every time it 
receives another TBAB_message from the same PA 
that prognoses the same upstream LRU. The PA 
defines the TBAB of the corresponding function. 
Then, it sends the TBAB (encapsulated in 
TBAB_Message) of this LRU to the PAs prognosing 
functions carried out by LRUs depending on the LRU 
for which the TBAB has been received. These PAs 
may then update the TBAB of their prognosed 
functions. As the RUL is defined to be the data that 
define remaining useful lifetime of a LRU processed 
by the monitoring layer, TBAB is defined to denote 
the same concept but take into account the 
structural dependencies of the LRU. It is to note that 
TBAB may be equal to RUL if the RUL sends by the 
monitoring is minor than the TBAB of upstream 
LRUs among the structural dependencies. 
Therefore, there are two different ways to process 
the prognosis depending on data received by the PA 
(RUL or TBAB_message). Whatever the data (RUL 
or TBAB_message) the prognostic function has to 
calculate, the results are recorded in the blackboard 
of the PA. Every time the PA receives a RUL or a 
TBAB_message, the old prognostic result is 
duplicated and one copy is updated according to the 
data received. The blackboard of a PA contains the 
evolution of the TBAB of the LRUs and its function 
implemented and the data (RUL or 
TBAB_message). For each TBAB of the LRUs, the 
data (RUL or TBAB_message) from which the TBAB 
has been computed are recorded. From this historic, 
it is possible to track the evolution of the TBAB of 
each LRUs and each function of the system 
according to received messages. 
 
Figure 6: Activity Diagram of PA 
The algorithm of the function ToPrognose(RUL) 
describes the behavior of the prognostic function 
when a PA receives a RUL sent by the Monitoring 
layer. 
 
Algorithm ToPrognose(RUL) 
Return the results in the blackboard of the PA 
 
1. Begin 
2. Update RUL value of the LRU 
3. Compute the TBAB of the LRU 
4. If TBAB of the LRU change 
5.  Query the database for structural 
dependencies 
6.  While it exists dependencies 
7.   Send(TBAB_Message) to PA 
8.  EndWhile 
9. EndIf 
10. End 
 
The Send function sends TBAB_Message to the PA 
in charge of prognosing the LRU incriminated by the 
TBAB_Message and call the function 
ToPrognose(TBAB_Message) of this PA. 
 
The algorithm of the function 
ToPrognose(TBAB_Message) describes the 
behavior of the prognostic function when receiving a 
TBAB_Message sent by another PA. 
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Algorithm ToPrognose(TBAB_Message) 
Return the results in the blackboard of the PA 
 
1. Begin 
2. If the LRU incriminated by the TBAB_Message 7 
77have not ever received a TBAB_message with the 
77number of this upstream LRU 
3.  Create TBAB_Message record for the 
incriminated LRU 
4. Else 
5.  Update TBAB_Message record for the 
incriminated LRU 
6. EndIf 
7. Compute the TBAB of the LRU 
8. If TBAB of the LRU change 
9.  Query the database for structural 
dependencies 
10.  While it exists dependencies 
11.   Send(TBAB_Message) to PA 
12.  EndWhile 
13. EndIf 
14: End 
 
The sequence of activities involved when a RUL is 
generated is similar to the one involved when a 
symptom is generated (see figure 5). For the 
prognosis, RULs are generated by the monitoring 
layer to PAs and TBAB_Message are exchanged 
between PAs. 
Both functions (To diagnose and to prognose) are 
activated when the HA system is started, but the 
diagnostic and prognostic functions are only 
processed when they receive a message, otherwise, 
they stand by. Diagnostic and prognostic sessions 
are finished when all the DAs and PAs are in 
sleeping mode. 
5. Example of implementation 
An example of implementation of the distributed HA 
function onto a system made of 2 functions both 
ensured by 3 LRUs is given in figure 7. This 
structure leads to the HA function to be implemented 
by 2 DAs and 2 PAs. DAs and PAs receive data 
generated by the monitoring layer respectively 
symptoms (full arrows between monitoring and 
health assessment layers) and RULs (dotted arrows 
between monitoring and health assessment layers). 
DAs communicate between them and KB (bold 
dotted arrows inside the health assessment layer). 
PAs do it between them and KB (bold arrows inside 
the health assessment layer) too. In fact, the 
communication between Agent of the same nature 
(DA or PA) is processed according to the structural 
dependencies between LRUs and the description of 
diagnostic and prognostic functions. DAs 
communicate with each other thanks to 
Faulty_LRU_Message and PAs thanks to 
TBAB_Message. 
 
 
Figure 7. An example of implementation of a distributed health assessment function 
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Each time a DA receives a symptom, it copies Δ1 
and Δ2 in its own blackboard and updates them with 
the result computed from the new symptom. This 
carries out the tracking of the evolution of the 
diagnostic process and this enables the diagnostic 
process to be non-monotone. If the DA receives a 
“propagation symptom”, this one is used to refine the 
diagnosis. To explain this activity, let us considered 
the example with 1,1,1LRU , 1,1,2LRU and 1,1,3LRU  
that are structurally dependant. SD (the only 
considered knowledge for this example) contains 
knowledge about the system: 
CONNECT( 1,1,1LRU , 1,1,2LRU ), 
CONNECT( 1,1,2LRU , 1,1,3LRU ). Each LRU has its 
proper monitoring periods for its symptoms. For 
example, if we consider one symptom per LRU, we 
suppose that the symptom emitted from the 
monitoring of 1,1,1LRU  can be send to the DA every 
5 minutes, the one of 1,1,2LRU  every minute and 
the one of 1,1,3LRU  every second. Let us consider 
that only 1,1,1LRU  failed, 1,1,2LRU  and 1,1,3LRU  
should be defined as “out of order”. DAs receive the 
symptoms when it is detected by the monitoring 
layer. Firstly, the DA receives 1,1,3,1S . So, 1,1,3LRU  
is declared has failed. Then, the DA receives 1,1,2,1S . 
Because of the structural dependencies, 1,1,2LRU  is 
declared failed and 1,1,3LRU  is updated to an “out 
of order” status. Finally, the DA receives 1,1,1,1S . 
Because of the structural dependencies, 1,1,1LRU  is 
declared “failed” and 1,1,2LRU  and 1,1,3LRU  are 
declared as “out of order”. The evolution of the 
status of these 3 LRUs according to the order of 
reception of symptoms is described in the 
chronogram in figure 8. 
The state of the LRU changes and the timestamps of 
its changes are updated. At the end of the HA 
process, a list of faulty LRUs with their causes, their 
dated changes of status and a list of failed functions 
are available. The causes of faulty LRUs are 
described in terms of sentences from FMEA studies 
or of faulty LRUs for “OO” LRUs. The causes of 
failed functions are described in terms of faulty 
LRUs. 
 
Considering the example as described in figure 7 
with this failure: LRU2,1,1 failed and the cause of the 
failure of LRU2,1,1 is known to be a power failure. 
After symptom generation, the diagnosis result is 
given by: 
∆1 = LRU2,1,1 (status: KF, cause: power failure, 
timestamp: 2009/07/05 15h26min56s) & LRU1,1,2 
(status: OO, cause LRU2,1,1 failure, timestamp: 
2009/07/05 15h26min57s) 
∆2 = Function11 (status: OO, cause: function12 failure, 
timestamp: 2009/07/05 15h26min58s) & Function21 
(status: KF, cause: LRU2,1,1 failure, timestamp: 
2009/07/05 15h26min57s) 
 
In each set ∆1 and ∆2 the LRUs or functions that do 
not work in a nominal mode are listed with their 
current states, the causes of their failures and the 
timestamps of their changes of state. 
 
 
Figure 8: Chronogram of the evolution of the status 
of LRUs 
 
Considering the same example as described in 
figure 7 with these RUL values at the beginning of 
the prognosis process: 
RUL (LRU1,1,1) = 10 TU (Time Unit), RUL (LRU1,1,2) = 
90 TU, RUL (LRU1,1,3) = 30 TU, RUL (LRU2,1,1) = 20 
TU, RUL (LRU2,1,2) = 40 TU, RUL (LRU2,1,3) = 50 TU. 
After prognosis process, the prognosis is given by: 
 
1Π  = RUL(LRU1,1,1) = 10 TU (Time Unit), RUL 
(LRU1,1,2) = 90 TU, RUL (LRU1,1,3) = 30 TU, RUL 
(LRU2,1,1) = 20 TU, RUL (LRU2,1,2) = 40 TU, RUL 
(LRU2,1,3) = 50 TU. 
2Π  = RUL (F1,1) = 10 TU, RUL (F2,1) = 20 TU. 
6. Conclusion 
The distributed diagnostic and prognostic functions, 
presented in this paper, implement a distributed 
health assessment for systems of systems. The 
health assessment is here based on a monitoring 
layer that provides symptoms and estimations of the 
remaining useful lives of the components of the 
system. 
 
The proposed diagnosis is a non-monotonic process 
that permits to take into accounts the events 
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detected by the monitoring layer and time stamped 
before their asynchronous transmissions. 
 
All the pieces of diagnostic and prognostic data and 
their timestamps are recorded to enable 
performance evaluation at the end of the health 
assessment session. Performance indicators (speed 
of convergence, data flow, and computational 
load...) may therefore be evaluated from the 
timestamps of the different data that are exchanged 
between the agents or stored. Further works will 
deal with performance evaluation of the proposed 
structure compared to centralized structures. 
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8. Glossary 
CS:  Complex System 
DA:  Diagnostic Agent 
FD:  Functional Description 
HS:  Health Status 
KB:  KnowledgeBase 
KF:  Known Failure 
LRU  Line Replaceable Unit 
OO:  Out of Order 
PA:  Prognostic Agent 
RUL:  Remaining Useful Lifetime 
SD:  Structural Description 
SK  System Knowledge 
TBAB: Time Before Abnormal Behavior 
TD:  Topological Description 
UF:  Unknown Failure 
